of 'democracy as majority-rule'. The consequence of the relativism majority-rule implies, is that for democracy all beliefs and convictions are equal, so they can freely compete with each other in a Holmsian way. The theoretical Popper we know from his work in the philosophy of science seems to be replaced by a more pragmatic or utilitarian Popper when it comes to political philosophy.
The problem here is in the fact that Popper tacitly accepts that the essence of democracy -as Kelsen argues -is in majority-rule, and then argues, on grounds of desirability, that we cannot tolerate anti-democratic parties. This maneuver is understandable. When one accepts majority-rule as the defining aspect of democracy, the conclusion is inescapable: P1 Democracy is majority rule P2 Anti-democratic parties can seize a majority C A democracy can abolish itself Rather than denying the consequences afterwards, it seems prudent to take a closer look at the premises of this argument. Although the truth of the second premise seems obvious, the rightness of the first premise is less certain. Is democracy actually defined by 'majority rule'?
The Dutch constitutional scholar George van den Bergh did not think so. His 1936 inaugural lecture at the University of Amsterdam is an impassioned defense of democracy in times where the future of democracy was no longer certain. 4 Van den Bergh dedicates much of his lecture to an analysis of a rather outdated Dutch law on the basis of which it would be possible to ban anti-democratic parties. He is, however, also concerned with the theoretical issue, in other words: the democratic paradox. Democracy, according to Van den Bergh, is not solely defined by majority-rule. Democracy is a system of self-correction. Characteristic of democracy is that it is always able to revoke its own decisions: every decision is subject to revocation. This leads Van den Bergh to conclude that all-but-one-decision for democracy has to be treated equally, namely: the decision to abolish democracy. The latter decision is incompatible with the nature of democracy, since the decision is irrevocable.
One could wonder, however, if this is really the sole irrevocable decision in a democracy. What to think, for instance, of a democratic decision to demolish some ageold monuments? There is, nevertheless, a subtle difference between such a decision and the decision to abolish democracy. Of course, due to factors in our outside world, the consequences of a democratic decision may be irreversible to some extent, but this does not make the decision itself irrevocable. When a democracy decides to tear down a monument and the monument is demolished accordingly, it can decide to revoke the former decisionwithin the framework of democracy -and try to reverse the consequences, i.e. rebuild the lost monument. When, on the other hand, a democracy decides to abolish itself, the whole framework is lost, which makes the decision not only irreversible, but also irrevocable: democracy decides not to decide any more.
Van den Bergh's approach thus makes it -in contrast to Popper -also theoretically justifiable to ban antidemocratic parties. When we therefore change the first premise to 'democracy is government by self-correction', it seems quite possible to develop a coherent theory of democracy in which anti-democratic parties can be expelled from the democratic arena. It is then no longer necessary to repudiate, out of desirability, a logically compelling conclusion in retrospect.
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